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Abstract
Privately owned banks had funded the Savings Bank Guarantee Fund (SBGF) and
Commercial Bank Guarantee Fund (CBGF) between 1921-1938 to provide guarantees and
capital injections to struggling banks. Bank legislation in 1961 made participation in such
guarantee funds compulsory for all Norwegian banks, and they were reorganized according
to that law. However, after banks began to struggle in the late 1980s, the two funds quickly
ran out of resources. The Norwegian Parliament (Storting) created the Government Bank
Insurance Fund (GBIF) in March 1991 to loan money to the two funds. They both quickly
incurred unsustainable amounts of debt to the government. In November 1991, the
Storting gave the GBIF the power to inject capital directly into banks through subordinated
debt, common and preferred equity, and primary capital certificates, with the Storting
allocating NOK 5 billion ($590 million) in initial funding to the GBIF. At the same time, it
established the Government Bank Investment Fund (Norwegian Statens
Bankinvesteringsfond, SBIF) to provide liquidity to struggling but solvent banks. From
1991-93, the GBIF and SBIF bought stakes in many banks, including three of the four
largest: Fokus Bank, Den norske Bank, and Christiania Bank. In 2002, the GBIF transferred
to the SBIF its last shares in Den norske Bank and ceased operating. In 2004, the SBIF
transferred to the Norwegian Ministry of Finance and Industry its 34% stake in DnB NOR,
the entity that resulted from the merger of Den norske Bank and the Union Bank of
Norway, and ceased operating.
Keywords: Capital Injections, CBGF, GBIF, Norway, Nordic Financial Crisis, SBIF, SBGF

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to broad-based capital injection
programs. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
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Norway – GBIF/SBIF (Nordic Crisis 1991)
At a Glance
The Norwegian banking crisis emerged
in the late 1980s following rapid
financial deregulation, excessive bank
lending, and a drop in oil prices. The
banking industry first addressed the
crisis in 1988-90 through its own selffunded Savings Bank Guarantee Fund
(SBGF)
and
Commercial
Bank
Guarantee Fund (CBGF), but both
quickly ran out of money. Norway
established the Government Bank
Insurance Fund (GBIF) in March 1991
to extend government loans to the two
private bank guarantee funds. The two
funds used these loans to inject capital
into
Norwegian
banks
while
guaranteeing their liabilities, but their
debt burdens mounted, and they could
not meet the need for capital.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: The GBIF was established as a short-term facility
to manage government ownership in banks initially
through loans to the two industry guarantee funds for
savings and commercial banks respectively, and later
through capital injections.
Announcement Date

January 25, 1991

Operational Date

March 15, 1991

End of Issuance
Window

N/A

Legal Authority

Act on Government Bank
Insurance Fund January 1991

Peak Utilization

NOK 16.2 billion ($1.9 billion)3

Participants

Fokus Bank, Christiania Bank,
Den norske Bank, others

In November 1991, the Norwegian
King, Norges Bank, Banking
Parliament (called the “Storting”) Administrators
Insurance and Securities
allowed the GBIF to make direct capital
Commission
injections to distressed banks and
established the Government Bank
Investment Fund (SBIF) to maintain state ownership of banks in the longer term. The
Storting allocated NOK 13.5 billion to the GBIF. However, the GBIF made 17 capital
injections totaling NOK 16.2 billion in the years 1991-93 as it received interest on part of
its capital, the CBGF and SBGF made payments on their loans, and the GBIF sold shares to
the SBIF. The NOK 16.2 billion includes NOK 13.1 billion of direct capital injections by the
GBIF into banks, most of which went to Norway’s three largest banks: Fokus Bank,
Christiania Bank, and Den norske Bank. It also includes GBIF loans of NOK 554 million to
the SBGF to inject capital into savings banks and NOK 2.5 billion to the CBGF to inject
capital into commercial banks. In addition to the GBIF capital injections, the Norwegian
government also allocated NOK 1 billion to the SBGF and introduced a program of
subsidized, low-interest central bank deposits, which cost the government about NOK 2.7
billion.

3

Per Yahoo Finance, $1 = NOK 8.56 on June 29, 2021
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After 1993, no more injections were required. The GBIF slowly sold its shares in banks
while receiving loan repayments. In 2002, it transferred its remaining holdings to the SBIF
and closed. In 2004, the SBIF transferred its holding of DnB NOR, the result of the merger of
Den norske bank and the Union Bank of Norway, to the Ministry of Trade and Finance and
closed.
Summary Evaluation
International observers generally view the government’s use of capital injections through
the GBIF and SBIF as a success that reduced the cost of the crisis, created normal conditions
for borrowers, and prevented the spread of financial problems and bank failures. However,
some observers suggested the government faced a conflict of interest in its role as both a
regulator and a shareholder. Some also criticized the government’s unilateral decision to
write down the value of its shares in Fokus Bank and Christiania Bank.
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Norway Context 1991–1995
GDP
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to
USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to
USD)

119,700,000,000 USD 1991
$45,858 in 1991

Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior debt)

Not available

Exchange Rate (to USD)

6.49 NOK to USD

Size of banking system

Not available

Size of banking system as a percentage of
GDP

1991 Bank deposits are 52.6% of
GDP

Size of banking system as a percentage of
financial system

Not available

Five-bank concentration of banking system

Five-bank asset concentration of
12.8% in 1998

Foreign involvement in banking system

5% in 1995

Government ownership of banking system

32% in 1995

Existence of deposit insurance

Not available

Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics, World Bank Global Financial
Development Database.
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Overview

Background
Norway’s financial deregulation in the 1980s ignited a rapid credit expansion. The
concurrent drop in oil prices led to a fall in asset values, and many weak firms went
bankrupt. This exposed banks to losses, and bank lending declined. The Norwegian banking
crisis began in 1988 when Sunnmørsbanken declared insolvency, the first bank failure in
the country since 1923. In the next four years, 13 banks that represented 95% of the total
commercial bank assets in Norway became under-capitalized or failed (Ongena 2003).
For many years, the Norwegian government had taken a hands-off approach to the banking
sector. It had no official deposit insurance to protect depositors in the event of a bank
failure. Banks argued they could handle any bank failures among themselves, with the
Norges Bank, the nation’s central bank, acting as a lender of last resort (Moe 2004).
The banking industry had its own deposit insurance programs, the Commercial Bank
Guarantee Fund (CBGF) and the Savings Bank Guarantee Fund (SBGF). These guarantee
funds could recapitalize a failed bank or provide guarantees and financial support to
facilitate a takeover, if those options were more cost-effective than liquidating the bank and
paying the depositors (Bergo 2003). Membership was compulsory and banks paid
membership fees. The two bank funds were reorganized in accordance with the Norwegian
bank legislation of 1961, and their activities became legally formalized. In addition, the
Bank of Norway and the Norwegian bank supervisor took more active roles on the boards
of the two guarantee funds in the 1980s. By 1988, the CBGF had NOK 4.1 billion of capital
(2.4% of member banks’ deposits from nonbanks). The SBGF had NOK 1.4 billion of capital,
with member banks providing guarantees of NOK 1.6 billion from their own funds. Savings
banks increased their guarantees through the SBGF by NOK 700 million in 1989. Both
funds had the Banking, Insurance, and Securities Commission (BISC) and Norges Bank
represented on their boards, along with five members elected by member banks (Moe
2004).
At the onset of the crisis, the CBGF injected $65 million (NOK 1.3 billion) into impaired
banks and facilitated their mergers with healthier banks. These capital injections appeared
to stabilize the banking industry by spring 1990 (Ongena 2003).
However, in January 1991, Norway’s three largest commercial banks announced losses
(Ongena 2003). Funds previously available through international markets were no longer
available or were prohibitively expensive. Recapitalizing Fokus bank, Norway’s thirdlargest commercial bank, depleted nearly all of CBGF’s remaining capital by February 1991.
The banking system was in danger of collapsing without further aid. At the peak of the
crisis in 1991, bank loan losses equaled 2.8% of GDP, while 9% of outstanding loans were
non-performing (Bergo 2003). The CBGF and SBGF were effectively depleted, and they
could no longer insure deposits after the situation deteriorated at the largest banks (Moe
2004).
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Program Description
In January 1991, the government announced that it would set up a Government Bank
Insurance Fund (GBIF). A concrete proposal was sent to the Norwegian Parliament (called
the “Storting”) on January 25. The Storting established the GBIF on March 5, 1991,
allocating NOK 5 billion to fund it. The Storting gave the GBIF a specific mandate: to lend
public money to the two private bank deposit guarantee funds, CBGF and SBGF, to
recapitalize failing banks (Bergo 2003). The CBGF used the borrowed funds to complete the
bailout of Fokus Bank and to begin injecting capital into Christiania Bank (Ongena 2003).
Shortly thereafter, Den norske bank, the largest Norwegian commercial bank, announced
its need for capital injections. It became clear that the GBIF’s funding would not be
sufficient to recapitalize the three banks.
By late 1991, the two private bank deposit insurance funds had borrowed as much as they
could (Milne 2009). After six months of debate, the Norwegian government made a few key
decisions in November 1991. The Storting extended the mandate of the GBIF, allowing it to
inject Tier 1 capital into distressed banks. It also responded to the worsening crisis by
adding NOK 6 billion to the GBIF, establishing a new Government Bank Investment Fund
(SBIF) with an initial 4.5 billion NOK, and empowering the government to order a bank to
write down its share capital, forcing losses on shareholders, if less than 25% of its share
capital remained (Ongena 2003; Drees 1998). The GBIF’s capital was regarded as a fiscal
expenditure, not an investment (Bergo 2005).
The government initially established the GBIF as a short-term facility. It developed the SBIF
to manage state investments in the banking sector over the long term (Drees 1998). The
SBIF could make its investment decisions with a commercial-long-term perspective
(Munthe 1992). Even banks that were not in crisis had trouble raising capital due to
investors’ lack of confidence in the banking sector, so the SBIF’s role was to invest
alongside private investors in banks’ capital issues. After the crisis, in 1995, the GBIF
became more of a contingency body, though it was still an owner of Norwegian bank shares
(Moe 2004). The SBIF purchased the GBIF’s stakes in the two largest banks, Den norske
Bank and Christiania bank. The SBIF became a vehicle to manage government ownership in
those banks. Figures 1 and 2 show the amount and timing of government involvement in
these three largest banks.
Outcomes
Before the GBIF made capital injections, it sought to attract private investors in the weak
banks (Bergo 2003). These efforts failed, and the government became the “owner of last
resort.” The Norwegian government also chose not to create a bad bank, as the ratio of
nonperforming loans at banks was not extremely high, and they wished to limit the
exposure of taxpayers to bank losses. The GBIF could make capital injections through
preferred shares, common shares, subordinated debt, and primary capital certificates
(equity instruments for savings banks) (Moe 2004).
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By late 1991, the GBIF completely took over Fokus and Christiania banks and had a 55%
stake in Den norske Bank (Ongena 2003). The Norwegian government continued to hold
the biggest stake in Den norske bank in 2003. In 1992, 54% of Norwegian bank assets were
under GBIF control, as it owned three of the four largest Norwegian banks (Den norske,
Christiania, and Fokus) (Milne 2009). The discounted value of Norwegian crisis resolution
gross fiscal costs was about 2.9% of Norway’s 1993 GDP. Adjusting for the value of
government-owned bank shares, the net fiscal costs were approximately 0.8% of GDP. This
included funding for the GBIF’s capital injection mechanism, guarantees provided by the
GBIF and SBIF, and funding allocations made to the CBGF and SBGF (Drees 1998).
By 2003, the only state ownership of Norwegian banks remaining was the SBIF’s stake in
Den norske Bank, which had declined to 47.8%. Den norske Bank was subsequently
merged with Union Bank of Norway, creating DnB NOR. As a result, SBIF’s stake in the
merged bank was reduced to 28.1%. However, the parliament decided to increase the
government’s shareholding to 34% through purchases in the market in 2004. This was to
maintain state ownership of the new entity and to prevent its sale to foreign entities,
keeping its management in the Nordic region (Storting 2003). The SBIF was subsequently
dissolved in 2004, and its holding in DnB NOR was transferred to the Ministry of Trade and
Industry, which handles most of the government ownership in corporations (Moe 2004).
During the crisis, the SBGF had purchased primary capital certificates in three savings
banks with its own funds and GBIF loans (Moe 2004). In spring 1994, it sold these above
par and repaid its GBIF debt with NOK 2 billion outstanding, eliminating all obligations the
savings bank sector had to the GBIF.
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Figure 1: Capital Injections from the CBGF and the GBIF to the Largest Commercial
Banks in 1991-1993 in Millions of NOK

Source: Moe 2004.
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Figure 2: Government Ownership in Norwegian Banks

Source: Moe 2004.
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Figure 3: Present Value as of December 31, 2001

Source: Moe 2004.

In total, the government support amounted to about NOK 20.7 billion, approximately 3% of
the banking sector assets in 1990. The CBGF disbursed approximately NOK 4.7 billion of its
own funds, provided by banks, while the SBGF disbursed about NOK 3.2 billion. The GBIF
injected NOK 16.2 billion in 17 injections, including NOK 554 million to the SBGF in loans,
NOK 2.5 billion to the CBGF in loans, and NOK 13.1 billion in direct injections to commercial
banks (Moe 2004).
Ex post analyses have concluded that Norwegian taxpayers actually made a profit off of the
nationalized banks after they were reprivatized over the late 1990s and early 2000s.
According to one source, while the gross fiscal cost of bank support was equivalent to 3.4%
of Norway’s GDP4, the net cost was -0.4% (Milne 2009). The share prices of the banks
increased while they were under government control (Honkapohja 2009).
Moe (2004) conducted another analysis, commissioned by the Norwegian central bank,
Norges Bank. He calculated present values of the government’s capital and other
investments in Norwegian banks during the crisis. He included investments by the GBIF,
SBIF, and Norges Bank (Moe 2004). He made his calculations by discounting the payment
flows, which all occurred in the 1990s, forward to 2001. Discounting forward makes them
higher than they were on the payment date. The value of ownership investments in banks
are recorded as incoming payments or positive values in this analysis. As shown in Figure
4

As a present value percentage of Norway’s 2001 GDP.
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3, the total present value at the end of 2001 was NOK 5.7 billion, meaning that the
government recorded that much in commercial return greater than it would have achieved
with other investments of comparable risk.

II.

Key Design Decisions

1. Part of a Package: The Government Bank Insurance Fund (GBIF) was not part of a
package, but it had many functions, and was implemented alongside several
other policies to address the financial crisis and worked in tandem with the
Government Bank Investment Fund (SBIF) to make capital injections.
The GBIF was not explicitly part of a package, although the Norwegian government did
pursue other policies to address the financial crisis (Moe 2004). These included loans from
Norges Bank at below-market interest rates, which amounted to about 10% of banks’
funding in late 1991; a Storting grant to the Savings Bank Guarantee Fund (SBGF); and a
75% reduction of banks’ annual premiums to their respective guarantee funds.
On March 5, 1991, the Storting established the Government Bank Insurance Fund (GBIF),
allocating NOK 5 billion to fund it. The Storting gave the GBIF a specific mandate: to lend
public money to the two private bank deposit guarantee funds, CBGF and SBGF, to
recapitalize failing banks (Bergo 2003). The CBGF used the borrowed funds to complete the
bailout of Fokus Bank and to begin injecting capital into Christiania Bank (Ongena 2003).
Shortly thereafter, Den norske bank, the largest Norwegian commercial bank, announced
its own need for capital injections. It became clear that the GBIF’s funding would not be
sufficient to recapitalize the three banks.
In late 1991, the Storting took action to strengthen the banks’ finances (Haare 2016). The
measures included an expansion of the GBIF by NOK 6 billion; the establishment of the
Government Bank Investment Fund (SBIF) with NOK 4.5 billion; subsidized, low-interest
deposits from Norges Bank; reduced premium payments that the banks were required to
pay the two bank guarantee funds; an appropriation of NOK 1 billion to the SBGF; and
reduced liquidity requirements for banks. Most importantly, it allowed the GBIF to make
direct capital injections in banks, rather than just loans to the two private bank guarantee
funds.
The GBIF was established as a short-term facility to manage government ownership in
banks, while the SBIF was established to manage long-term state investments in the
banking sector on commercial principles, rather than purely for financial stability purposes
(Drees 1998, Munthe 1992). The SBIF worked with private investors to provide capital to
banks that were not in crisis to help overcome the lack of confidence in the markets (Moe
2004). After 1995, the GBIF became more of a contingency body and the SBIF managed
state ownership in the banking industry.
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2. Legal Authority: The Norwegian Parliament, or “Storting,” established GBIF as a
temporary facility to combat the financial crisis by providing loans to private
bank guarantee funds. Later, it established the SBIF as a more permanent facility
to manage government ownership in individual banks and allowed the GBIF to
make direct capital injections (Storting 1991a, Storting 1991b).
The GBIF was a temporary facility that was intended to provide loans to the Commercial
and Savings Bank Guarantee Funds, so that they in turn could capitalize distressed banks
(Drees 1998). The Norwegian government planned to wind the GBIF down by 2000 and
transfer the shares it held to the SBIF. The SBIF was established as an indefinite facility to
manage long-term state investments in banks. The Norwegian government used the SBIF’s
interest in Norway’s two largest commercial banks to ensure that they focused on financing
Norwegian industries and that they would not lend imprudently.
The Storting initially proposed establishing the GBIF on January 25, 1991 and established it
on March 15, 1991. The Storting allowed the GBIF to make direct capital injections on
November 29, 1991 (Moe 2004). This allowed the GBIF to purchase shares, primary capital
certificates,5 or other equity capital instruments in Norwegian banks that could not raise
private capital. This mechanism would result in GBIF’s owning 100% of the shares in banks
that had lost all their capital.
The Government Bank Investment Fund (SBIF) was established in November 1991 with
NOK 4.5 billion (Drees 1998). The SBIF was intended to make capital injections on
commercial principles and help banks that were not in crisis raise capital when there was a
general lack of confidence in the markets (Moe 2004). It was designed to participate
alongside private investors in bank capital instruments. During the same time, Norway
made amendments to the Community Banking Act that allowed the government to write
down a bank’s share capital to zero, forcing losses on shareholders, if less than 25% of its
share capital remained.
The Relationship Between the GBIF and the SBIF
Initially in 1991, when the SBIF was established and the GBIF was granted permission to
make capital injections, it was not clear what the relationship between the two institutions
would be (Moe 2004). A 1992 document maintained that the GBIF’s equity holdings were
in service of crisis management while the SBIF’s holdings were in an investor role
alongside private owners. The GBIF provided capital support to struggling banks during
the crisis, making sure to impose requirements including cost cutting and balance sheet
reductions that helped maintain stability. The GBIF’s purchases of shares and primary
capital certificates granted it varying degrees of ownership in different banks, but it
generally avoided directly intervening in bank operations, preferring to exert influence as a
contracting party.

A primary capital certificate was the equity instrument of savings banks. Certificate holders had somewhat
limited rights compared to shareholders of commercial banks.
5
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3. Governance: The GBIF was governed by a board appointed by the central bank,
the supervisory agency, and the Norwegian Government.
The GBIF was governed by a board of experts that made its decisions, carrying out
operations at a distance from political authorities. The three-member board was appointed
by the Government and supplemented by two non-voting representatives from Norges
Bank and the Norwegian financial supervisor under the Ministry of Finance, the BISC
(Banking, Insurance, and Securities Commission), with a secretariat provided by Norges
Bank (Moe 2004, Storting 1991a). However, it maintained a close relationship with
Norwegian financial supervisors and Norges Bank, the latter of which also played a role in
Norway’s financial stability infrastructure (Bergo 2003). Norges Bank was the lender of last
resort for recapitalized banks, and a source of liquidity support to sound financial
institutions, though banks did not have to resort to its provisions as they generally kept
their funding.
4. Funding Sources: The Storting initially funded the GBIF with NOK 5 billion in
January 1991. It later increased the GBIF’s funding by NOK 6 billion and funded
SBIF with NOK 4.5 billion in November 1991.
The GBIF was initially funded with 5 billion NOK, later increased with an additional 6
billion NOK in November 1991, when the Storting allowed it to make direct capital
injections in banks (Andersen 2014; Drees 1998). The SBIF was funded by 4.5 NOK to
invest in banks alongside private investors, eventually disposing of its shares. In total, the
Storting appropriated NOK 13.5 billion to the GBIF (Moe 2004).
5. The CBGF and SBGF made capital injections primarily with the GBIF’s support
after 1991, but maintained guarantees in many affected banks.
Prior to the establishment of the GBIF, these guarantee funds could recapitalize a failed
bank or provide guarantees and financial support to facilitate a takeover, if those options
were more cost-effective than liquidating the bank and paying the depositors (Bergo 2003).
Membership was compulsory and banks paid membership fees. By 1988, the CBGF had
NOK 4.1 billion of capital (2.4% of member banks’ deposits from nonbanks). The SBGF had
NOK 1.4 billion of capital, with member banks providing guarantees of NOK 1.6 billion from
their own funds. Savings banks increased their guarantees through the SBGF by NOK 700
million in 1989. Both funds had the Banking, Insurance, and Securities Commission (BISC)
and Norges Bank represented on their boards, along with five members elected by member
banks (Moe 2004). At the onset of the crisis, the CBGF injected $65 million (NOK 1.3 billion)
into impaired banks and facilitated their mergers with healthier banks. These capital
injections appeared to stabilize the banking industry by spring 1990 (Ongena 2003).
However, in January 1991, Norway’s three largest commercial banks announced losses
(Ongena 2003). Funds previously available through international markets were no longer
available or were prohibitively expensive. Recapitalizing Fokus bank, Norway’s thirdlargest commercial bank, depleted nearly all of CBGF’s remaining capital by February 1991.
The banking system was in danger of collapsing without further aid. At the peak of the
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crisis in 1991, bank loan losses equaled 2.8% of GDP, while 9% of outstanding loans were
non-performing (Bergo 2003). The CBGF and SBGF were effectively depleted, and they
could no longer insure deposits after the situation deteriorated at the largest banks (Moe
2004).
After the GBIF was founded, it was able to make loans to the CBGF and SBGF so that they
could better recapitalize failing banks. Figure 4 shows the loans made from the GBIF to the
two guarantee funds and Figure 5 shows how the guarantee funds supported banks. Figure
6 shows a timeline of bank support from these institutions.
Figure 4: Support Loans to the SBGF and the CBGF (in thousands of NOK)

Source: Moe 2004.
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Figure 5: Disbursements and Outstanding Guarantees in Connection with Guarantee
Funds’ Involvement January 1, 1988–December 31, 1993 (in millions of NOK)
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Source: Moe 2004.
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Figure 6: Norway: Funds Used in Rescue Operations

Source: Drees 1998.

6. Eligible Institutions: The GBIF first made loans to the CBGF and SBGF so they
could recapitalize banks. It later had the authority to inject capital directly into
distressed banks and no further detail has been found on which banks were
eligible.
When the GBIF was originally established on March 5, 1991, its mandate was to lend public
money to the two private bank deposit guarantee funds, CBGF and SBGF, so that they could
continue to recapitalize failing banks (Ongena 2003, Bergo 2003).
When the Storting extended the mandate of the GBIF in late 1991, distressed banks were
eligible to receive capital injections directly from the GBIF (Drees 1998). These banks were
also eligible for SBIF share purchases, which occurred on a commercial and long-term
basis.
The GBIF also injected capital to liquidate Oslobanken. Though Norwegian banks as a
whole reported improvements in 1993, Oslobanken, which was already owned in part by
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the SBIF, applied for GBIF capital since it could not meet its capital requirement (Moe
2004). The GBIF initially had rejected this request, instead attempting and failing to
orchestrate a merger with another bank. It is unclear why GBIF had rejected the request.
Due to the bank’s reported negative equity capital and a concern for systemic risk, the GBIF
injected capital alongside CBGF guarantees to facilitate the liquidation of Oslobanken. This
concluded in November 2000.
7. Capital Characteristics: The GBIF and SBIF made indirect and direct capital
injections, and also issued convertible loans.
GBIF
In early 1991, Christiania Bank and Fokus Bank both applied for capital injections from the
CBGF. The CBGF had depleted funds, so in August 1991, the GBIF loaned nearly half its
funding to the CBGF to finance capital injections of NOK 1.8 billion of preferred shares in
Christiania Bank and NOK 650 million of preferred shares in Fokus Bank (Kaen 1997). In
October 1991, the GBIF provided two loans of NOK 160 million to the SBGF to recapitalize
Sparebanken Rogaland and Sparebanken Midt-Norge. These capital injections were
intended to bring the recapitalized banks to capital adequacy by the end of the year (Moe
2004). The GBIF designed these injections to be preferred capital without voting rights that
accrued dividends (Storting 1991c).
In the third quarter of 1991, Christiania Bank had incurred losses so great that all common
and preferred equity capital, of which NOK 2.7 billion had been injected by the CBGF, was
written off (Moe 2004). Fokus Bank had made losses that wiped out all common equity and
some preferred equity, while Den norske Bank had only NOK 327 million of share capital
and all its preferred equity remaining.
The GBIF signed agreements to provide all three banks capital injections mostly in common
equity, and helped Den norske and Christiania banks achieve an 8% capital ratio by the end
of 1991 and you can see these transactions in Figure 7. Fokus Bank achieved a 5.5% capital
ratio, but this was adequate as it had promised to reduce its balance sheet significantly in
the following two years. By the end of 1991, the government completely took over Fokus
Bank and Christiana Bank, and became the majority owner of Den norske Bank (Moe
2004).
Later in 1992, as the banks continued to post losses, the GBIF agreed to provide NOK 4
billion in mostly preferred equity to again bring Den norske Bank and Christiania Bank up
to an 8% capital adequacy ratio, subject to additional appropriations by the Norwegian
Storting, and to help Fokus Bank achieve the 8% capital adequacy ratio, which occurred
after it sold some of its holdings (Moe 2004; Figure 7). This would also bring Fokus Bank to
an 8% capital ratio after parts of the bank were sold as per its contract with GBIF. The GBIF
agreed to inject NOK 600 million in Den norske Bank, and NOK 200 million in Fokus Bank if
their capital ratios dipped below 3.8% in late 1993, but this did not occur.
The GBIF later sold 229 million shares of Christiania Bank to the SBIF at a price based on
the equity capital per share in the bank’s 1992 annual accounts. The GBIF also had
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contracted to provide Fokus Bank additional capital if needed to maintain its capital
requirements, and in 1993, contributed NOK 20 million to help it merge with
Samvirkebanken (Moe 2004). Consequently, there was a small minority of private owners
in Fokus bank.
The GBIF also made loans to the SBGF to support capital injections to Sparebanken
Rogaland and Sparebanken Midt-Norge (Moe 2004).
Figure 7: Overview of GBIF’s Decisions Concerning Support Measures (in millions of
NOK)

Source: Moe 2004.

SBIF
The SBIF made two primary capital certificate injections in 1991, purchasing 19.6% of
Oslobanken and 32.3% of Samvirkebanken to meet capital adequacy requirements (Figure
7). It also made two convertible loans in the savings bank Union Bank of Norway totaling
NOK 1 billion and convertible loans of NOK 70 million and NOK 25.6 million in the savings
banks Sparebanken Vest and Sparebanken Møre respectively. Of the 1992 capital
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injections, NOK 1.5 billion occurred through the sale of equity capital to the SBIF (Moe
2004).
8. Allocating loss to existing shareholders: Before GBIF injected capital, private
shareholders bore losses.
Before GBIF directly injected capital, it conducted an audit of the bank and required that all
losses calculated by an audit would first be borne by the original private shareholders
(Milne 2009). This decision is generally made by the banks’ General Meetings, but if the
bank refused to do so, an amendment to the Commercial Bank Act allowed the government
to write down the share capital of the bank against the losses in the audited interim
account (Bergo 2003). This was done twice, when shareholders refused to write down a
bank’s shares as required by GBIF. This made certain that shareholders bore a bank’s
losses before taxpayer money was put on the table.
The conditions imposed on injections made through GBIF support were unattractive to
shareholders and bank managers, incentivizing them to try private-sector solutions first,
and use the GBIF only as a last resort (Bergo 2003). These conditions also made sure that
GBIF-capitalized banks did not have a competitive advantage over other banks. The
condition that required losses to be absorbed by shareholders was also imperative in
gaining political support from the electorate to conduct rescue operations.
9. Fate of management: The GBIF claimed board seats on each of the two private
bank guarantee funds, and generally replaced the management of recapitalized
banks.
The GBIF replaced two bank-elected members each from the boards of the CBGF and the
SBGF after it began making loans to them. This gave the government a majority of four on
each seven-member board. These new guarantee-fund boards would choose the new
boards of recapitalized banks. They often replaced bank management, though it was not
required (Moe 2004; Bergo 2003). However, the governance structure of the banks
remained intact while the ownership was transferred to the GBIF (Bergo 2005). This
ensured that politicians could not easily micromanage the recapitalized banks and
prevented the GBIF from interfering in the banks’ day-to-day business operations. A
commenter close to the program confirmed that there was agreement among authorities
that government funds should not have lasting and direct influence on the daily operations
of the banks.
10. Other Conditions: The GBIF injections were contingent on a number of
conditions including the write-down of old capital to cover bank losses and a
reduction in operating costs.
Capital support through the private bank guarantee funds required a bank to present a
business plan that improved profits and reduced risk-weighted assets (Drees 1998). For
loans made to the private bank guarantee funds, the GBIF had the power to impose
conditions on both the private bank guarantee funds and banks that received injections
from them (Moe 2004).
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Capital injections performed through Norwegian private bank guarantee funds or directly
from the GBIF were contingent on reducing bank operating costs, downsizing some
activities, and taking measures to restrain growth in total assets. The banks that received
GBIF injections were required to regularly update the GBIF on their compliance with the
conditions set during the injections and their progress towards profitability (Bergo 2005).
Conditions could include programs for cutting operating costs and bank branches (Moe
2004). These conditions were customized for each bank and made public (Bergo 2003).
The GBIF required the write-down of old capital to cover bank losses prior to capital
injections to Fokus, Christiania, and Den norske banks in 1991. The shareholders of Fokus
and Christiania banks could not agree on how their capital should be written down, so the
Norwegian government issued royal decrees on December 20, 1991, that wrote their
common equity capital down to zero. The GBIF subsequently became the sole common
equity shareholder of Fokus and Christiania banks; as Den norske Bank still had private
common equity shareholders, the GBIF purchased preferred shares from it. In 1991 Den
norske Bank also acquired mortgage company RealKredit, whose shareholders purchased
shares in the bank and underwrote new preference capital alongside the SBIF (Moe 2004).
The SBIF subsequently became the majority owner of Den norske Bank with 55.6% of its
shares.
In 1992, the lowest priority capital was written down against uncovered losses prior to
new capital injections. In Den norske Bank, private share capital, CBGF preferred capital,
and the lowest rated GBIF preferred capital were written down to zero, while in Christiania
Bank, the par value of common shares was written down from NOK 25 to NOK 7. Fokus
bank had all its CBGF preferred capital written down to zero, and its common shares were
written down from NOK 25 to NOK 11 (Moe 2004). In 1991-92, the CBGF lost NOK 5.8
billion on the preferred shares it purchased in the top three Norwegian banks.
As the crisis eased in 1993, the GBIF became increasingly confronted with issues of
ownership and increases of capital, especially as existing agreements between GBIF and the
banks that received capital injections often conflicted with pricing bank shares sensibly
when GBIF was considering exiting its injections. When Christiania and Den norske banks
sought to issue new capital, the GBIF replaced its agreements with the banks to allow it
(Moe 2004). The new agreements clarified the GBIF’s temporary role as a contingency
safety net until the CBGF regained sufficient resources; the agreements required regular
reporting to the GBIF but allowed the banks to make commercial decisions without
encumberment. Fokus Bank arranged a similar agreement in 1995.
11. Exit Strategy: There was no set deadline for reprivatizing the banks that received
capital injections, but GBIF was intended to be a temporary measure and the
participation was gradually phased out after the crises.
In June 1992, the Norwegian state offered former shareholders a call option on 25% of its
shareholding of Christiania Bank (Munthe 1992). They were offered at 16 NOK each, a
discount of 36% from their book value of 25 NOK, and a discount of 66% relative to the
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purchase price of 46.73 NOK that the government had paid. Still, former shareholders
purchased only 2.3% of the shares offered (Moe 2004).
There was no set deadline for reprivatizing the banks that received capital injections,
allowing the GBIF to set its own strategy for selling the shares it held (Bergo 2005).
However, the GBIF was intended to be a temporary measure, and its participations were to
be gradually phased out after the crisis (Munthe 1992).
The Norwegian Storting addressed the GBIF and SBIF’s role in the banks in 1993-94, by
calling for a continuation of at least one-third state ownership of Den norske and
Christiania banks through 1997 to maintain decision-making in Norway, focusing on
Norwegian industries (Moe 2004). State ownership of Fokus bank was maintained. The
SBIF was to dispose of its holdings in all but the two major banks, selling assets gradually
when commercial conditions allowed it.
In December 1993, Christiania Bank sought additional private capital to strengthen its
capitalization, and issued NOK 2 billion of equity, bringing the government’s stake down to
68.9% (Moe 2004). The GBIF decided to convert its preferred shares in Den norske Bank to
common equity, making the GBIF the majority owner; the government owned 87.5% of Den
norske Bank in December 1993. The following spring, Den norske Bank issued NOK 1
billion in shares, and the GBIF also sold NOK 1 billion of its shares, reducing state
ownership to 72%.
During the crisis, the SBGF had purchased primary capital certificates in three savings
banks with its own funds and GBIF loans (Moe 2004). In spring 1994, it sold these above
par and repaid its GBIF debt with NOK 2 billion outstanding, eliminating all obligations the
savings-bank sector had to the GBIF.
As the GBIF was intended to be a safety net until the CBGF and the SBGF could support
their own industries, money was transferred from the GBIF to the Treasury as shares were
sold from 1994 onward based on the GBIF’s liquidity needs (Moe 2004). While the SBGF
had regained its health by that time, the CBGF did not repay its GBIF loans until 1995, and
the GBIF remained part of the commercial bank safety net while it rebuilt its capital.
The government gradually sold GBIF’s shares in banks after the crisis to the SBIF and on
the open market (Meinich 2019). The GBIF sold Fokus Bank to Danske Bank, and gradually
sold Christiania Bank, which eventually merged with Nordea, a pan-Nordic group
(Honkapohja 2009). The GBIF also sold Den norske Bank shares gradually, though the
government still owns 34% of DnB NOR, the entity resulting from the merger of Den norske
Bank and the Union Bank of Norway. The GBIF’s holding amounted to about 20% of
Norway’s total banking assets as of 2005 (Bergo 2005).
The Norwegian government keeps its 34.21% holding in DnB NOR to prevent it being sold
to foreign banks as of 2019 (Steigum 2010; DnB Group 2020).
The GBIF’s shares were managed by the SBIF starting in 1995. By the end of 1995, Fokus
Bank had been fully privatized, and by the end of 1996, the GBIF and SBIF only held
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reduced stakes in Den norske Bank and Christiania bank (Moe 2004). Later the Storting
recommended the state retain ownership in only one institution, which would be Den
norske Bank; consequently, Christiania Bank shares were sold to Merita Nordbanken in
2000. In the spring of 2001, the last remaining shares held by the GBIF, 104 million shares
or 13% of DnB NOR, were sold in the open market, and the GBIF was subsequently no
longer an owner of bank shares (Meinich 2019).
It became clear that the GBIF was no longer necessary to support the two private bank
deposit guarantee funds by 2001, and in 2002, the Fund was abolished (Moe 2004).
Christiania, Fokus, and Den norske bank no longer had to report quarterly to the GBIF.
Similarly, the SBIF transferred excess funds to the Treasury from 1993 onwards, paying
more than NOK 26 billion in dividends to the state before it was dissolved in 2004. In 2003,
the SBIF had a 47.8% stake in DnB ASA, the parent company of Den norske, which merged
with the Union Bank of Norway to form DnB NOR ASA in December 2003 (Moe 2004). The
SBIF initially held 28.1% of the merged company, though the Norwegian Storting agreed
that the SBIF should make private purchases to increase its stake to 34% of DnB NOR. In
2004, when the SBIF was terminated, its DnB NOR shares were transferred to the Ministry
of Trade and Industry.
12. Relevant Regulatory Changes: The Commercial Bank Act was amended before
the injection to entitle the government to write down the share capital of a bank
against losses in the audited interim accounts, if the shareholders’ General
Meeting did not do so.
This was to force the banks to take on the losses before the taxpayers’ money was injected
into these banks. This authority was used in two instances where shareholders refused to
write down a bank’s shares as required by GBIF. Shareholders in one bank brought the case
to the courts but lost (Bergo 2003).

III. Evaluation
The government shareholding in DnB NOR illustrates the “too-big-to-fail” problem endemic
to all Nordic countries (Steigum 2010). DnB NOR’s total assets amounted to about 90% of
Norway’s GDP. As of 2019, the GBIF holds a blocking 34% minority in DnB NOR, amounting
to about 20% of Norway’s banking sector (Bergo 2005; DnB Group 2020).
After the crisis, the two major banks that were rescued had profit-to-asset ratios that were
similar to other Norwegian banks that had not been recapitalized by the GBIF (Bergo
2005).
Bergo, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank, acknowledged the success of GBIF
interventions in Norwegian banks, but raised a few concerns. First, there exists a potential
conflict of interest between the government’s role as a regulator and supervisor of financial
markets, and its role as a shareholder. In addition, how will the GBIF’s interest in DnB NOR
affect its actions if DnB NOR fails? After the winding down of the GBIF, the Norwegian
government transferred the management of DnB NOR from the Ministry of Finance to the
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Ministry of Industry, so that the regulating body was not directly responsible for the
shares. Bergo believes it is possible but unlikely that political authorities would intervene
in the bank for political purposes; it would be difficult, as the government is a minority
owner of DnB NOR, and its governance structure does not give a minority owner easy
control. However, Bergo is concerned that the government might be unwilling to write
down DnB NOR shares to cover losses, or would not credibly treat it the same way as
privately owned banks.
A commenter close to the program remarked that most of the decisions on solving the
banking crises in Norway had broad political support in the Storting. He stated that there
was agreement that government funds should not have lasting and direct influence on the
daily operations of the banks. Without strong Norwegian private-capital owners, the
conservatives in government agreed that the government should maintain a key role as
owner in DnB NOR. The alternative would have been to let foreign owners dominate the
operations of the largest bank in Norway. The key decision where the Ministry of Finance
took an active and leading role, was the appointment of the board of the bank, and the
Ministry took care not to be strongly involved in other operations of the bank.
Since banks that received a capital injection from the government were able to continue
their normal operations, borrowers faced normal credit conditions (Bergo 2003). Bergo
asserts that the economic costs of the crisis were greatly reduced because capital injections
saved some banks from closure and maintained the supply of credit. The GBIF was
established as a third line of defense, after equity capital and private bank guarantee funds,
and was successful in preventing systemic damage caused by bank losses. However, Bergo
also supported closing the GBIF to avoid moral hazard after the crisis and advocated for
solutions that focus on saving the financial system rather than shoring up individual banks.
The government’s decision to write the capital of Fokus and Christiania banks to zero was
controversial. A 1997 retrospective government report studied the bank’s values and
simulated alternatives, ultimately deciding that it was a prudent decision. However, it
criticized the government for preventing private shareholders from articulating arguments
in their defense prior to the write-down of their shares. This contributed to a lack of
confidence in the decision. The report concludes that there is some doubt about whether it
was necessary to write down shares in Den norske Bank, which had fewer losses and
whose losses came about in part due to its government-orchestrated purchase of
Realkredit. The report criticizes the government for not evaluating Den norske Bank’s
discounted future profit value, which the report estimates would have sufficed to
demonstrate that even ordinary share capital had value and did not need to be written
down (Moe 2004). However, Den norske Bank’s own shareholders decided to write down
the capital instead of seeking better prospects.
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Appendixes

Appendix A: Den norske Bank

Source: Moe 2004.
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Appendix B: Christiania Bank

Source: Moe 2004.
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Appendix C: Fokus Bank

Source: Moe 2004.

Appendix D: Oslobanken

Source: Moe 2004.
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Appendix E: Sparebanken NOR

Source: Moe 2004.

Appendix F: Timeline of Major Events
1988: Failure of Sunnmørsbanken; CBGF guarantee of its commitments, and Norges Bank
liquidity support (Moe 2004).
November 1988: Sparebanken Nord and Tromsø Sparebank insolvent.
July 1989: Sparebanken Nord and Tromsø Sparebank merge to make Sparebanken NordNorge; get NOK 1.5 billion loan from Norges Bank.
October 1989: Norion Bank fails; CBGF guarantees only nonbank deposits; Norges Bank
loses on its loans and provides a new liquidity loan that CBGF guarantees.
January 1990: Sunnmørsbanken merges with Christiania Bank.
Late 1990: Fokus Bank gets NOK 1.5 billion guarantee from CBGF.
1989-1990: SBGF disburses NOK 1.9 billion (1% total assets of savings banks) in nine
banks, and guarantees of NOK 1.2 billion; CBGF makes NOK 1.4 billion of provisions to
Sunnmørsbanken and Norion Bank and agrees to make capital injections on a case-by-case
basis up to NOK 2 billion amongst all member banks (Moe 2004).
January 25, 1991: Proposal to establish the GBIF.
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March 15, 1991: GBIF is established with capital of NOK 5 billion.
June 17, 1991: CBGF approves injection of preferred capital to Den norske Bank,
Christiania Bank, and Smvirkebanken NOK 1.6 billion.
Late June 1991: Equity guarantee of NOK 1.5 billion in Fokus Bank replaced with NOK 1.5
billion in preferred shares.
June 28, 1991: CBGF offered NOK 1 billion of preferred shares; distributed only to
Samvirkebanken, though other banks also applied for support: NOK 196 million was
allocated.
August 1991: GBIF provides support loans to the CBGF for preferred share capital
injections to Christiania Bank and Fokus Bank, respectively.
October 1991: GBIF gives SBGF two loans of NOK 160 million each to buy primary capital
certificates in Sparebanken Rogaland and Sparebanken Midt-Norge.
October 1991: The Storting establishes the SBIF with NOK 4.5 billion; allocates an
additional NOK 6 billion to GBIF, proposes subsidized deposits from Norges Bank, reduced
premium payments to two guarantee funds, appropriates NOK 1 billion to the SBGF, and
reduces liquidity requirements for banks.
November 29, 1991: The Storting allows the GBIF to directly purchase shares, primary
capital certificates and other equity capital instruments, and allows the King in Council to
write down bank shares (Moe 2004).
December 20, 1991: Share capital of Christiania Bank and Fokus Bank are written down
to zero and GBIF purchases share capital in both banks, becoming their sole owner.
1991: SBIF investment of 19.6% in new shares in Oslobanken; SBIF investment of 32.2% in
new shares in Samvirkebanken.
Spring 1992: GBIF offers former shareholders of Christiania Bank the option to purchase
25% of shares; 2.3% were repurchased; SBIF and investors underwrite preferred shares in
Den norske Bank—SBIF owns 55.6% of shares.
Spring/Summer 1992: GBIF makes three loans of NOK 219 million to SBGF to fund capital
injections to Sparebanken Rogaland and Sparebanken Midt-Norge, as well as a NOK 15
million loan to cover deficit in Hof Sparebank and the SBGF’s guarantee liability in
Hedmark Sparebanken.
Late 1992: GBIF injects NOK 4 billion to Fokus, Den norske, and Christiania banks to help
them achieve capital adequacy ratios; NOK 1.5 billion of this was SBIF injections.
Late 1992: Den norske share capital, CBGF preferred shares, and low-ranking GBIF
preferred shares written down to zero; Christiania shares written down from NOK 25 to
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NOK 7, Fokus Bank CBGF preferred shares written down to zero, and share par value
written down NOK 25 to NOK 11 (Moe 2004).
1992: SBIF invests NOK 1 billion of convertible subordinated debt in Union Bank of
Norway and NOK 700 million in Sparebanken Vest and NOK 25.6 million in Sparebanken
Møre.
April 1993: Oslobanken applies for GBIF funding—GBIF says no but injects share capital to
help liquidate the bank.
December 1993: Christiania Bank raises NOK 2 billion of private share capital—
government stake reduced to 68.9%; GBIF converts preferred shares in Den norske Bank to
shares making GBIF majority owner of 87.5%.
1993: GBIF provides conditional capital of NOK 20 million of shares to help facilitate the
merger of Fokus Bank and Samvirkebanken; SBIF converts subordinated debt in
Sparebanken NOR to shares, owning 48% of the bank in 1993; GBIF writes down all shares
of Oslobanken and becomes its sole owner.
Late 1993: New agreement between GBIF and Christiania bank that ended the obligation
of the bank to report to the GBIF, and the GBIF ability to impose new requirements, as soon
as the bank achieved its capital ratio and the CBGF achieved its minimum size to serve as
the safety net for the industry.
Early 1994: New agreement between GBIF and Den norske Bank.
May/June 1994: NOK 1 billion of GBIF Den norske shares and NOK 1 billion of new Den
norske shares sold in market—government ownership down to 72%.
Spring 1994: SBGF sells primary capital certificates in Sparebanken Rogaland,
Sparebanken Midt-Norge, and Sparebanken Nord-Norge above par and repays all its debt
to GBIF with NOK 2 billion remaining. End of savings-bank sector obligations to GBIF.
Spring 1995: New agreement between GBIF and Fokus Bank.
1994-1995: GBIF transfers ownership of banks to the SBIF but keeps 16.2% of Den norske
Bank.
1995: GBIF sells Fokus Bank to Danske Bank; CBGF repays all its loans obligations to GBIF.
1996: GBIF sells Christiania Bank shares to SBIF and market.
2000: GBIF liquidates Oslobanken completely; SBIF sells its shares in Christiania Bank to
Merita Nordbanken.
2001: GBIF sells 104 million shares or 13% of Den norske Bank into the open market.
2002: GBIF abolished.
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2003: Den norske Bank merges with Union Bank of Norway to form DnB NOR. SBIF 47.8%
share of Den norske becomes 28.1% of DnB NOR.
2004: SBIF terminated; shares in DnB NOR transferred to Ministry of Trade and Industry.
Copyright 2021 © Yale University. All rights reserved. To order copies of this material or to receive
permission to reprint any or all of this document, please contact the Yale Program on Financial
Stability at ypfs@yale.edu.

556

